# Threat Modeling LLMs & Their Integrations

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# Whois?

Prof. Andrei **Kucharavy**

- Assistant Professor
  @ Informatics Institute of HEVS
- Co-founder
  @ HES-SO Gen Learning Center
- Cyber-Defence Campus Fellow (2020)
  “Generative ML in Cyber-Defence”
- Safety and Security
  @ Apertus Team
- ”On-Premises LLMS: the Safe Way”
  @AMLD ‘24/’25
- Scientific Editor:
  LLMs in Cybersecurity (Springer)
- Contributor: OWASP & NIST PWG GenAI

https://discord.gg/xUEZetHn



# Do We Even Need Threat Modeling?

So let's rifle through this ne'er-do-well's bag of tricks, tools and tells. Let us borrow from his literary perspective. I imagine a *Cybercriminal Code of Ethics* might go something like this (again, in the voice of a seasoned crook):

> -If you hook it up to the Internet, we're gonna hack at it.
>
> -If what you put on the Internet is worth anything, one of us is gonna try to steal it.
>
> -Even if we can't use what we stole, it's no big deal. There's no hurry to sell it. Also, we know people.
>
> -We can't promise to get top dollar for what we took from you, but hey — it's a buyer's market. Be glad we didn't just publish it all online.
>
> -If you can't or won't invest a fraction of what your stuff is worth to protect it from the likes of us, don't worry: You're our favorite type of customer!


https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/krebss-immutable-truths-about-data-breaches/

# Securing an SQL Query App

https://huggingface.co/spaces/effixis/shared-amld-sql-injection-demo

# Threat Modeling




- What does the attacker might want?
- How could they get there?
- How can we prevent them from getting there?

# Threat Modeling Tools: Cybersecurity vs LLM-sec

**Cybersecurity frameworks**

- OWASP /& Top 10
- NIST
- MITRE ATT&CK
- Lockheed—Martin Cyber Kill Chain
- STRIDE over DFD

**Current AI frameworks**

- OWASP /& Top 10 AI
- NIST GenAI
- MITRE ATLAS
- NVIDIA AI Kill Chain
- STRIDE over DFD

# OWASP TOP 10 AI

- What if you use an open-weights model?
- What if your LLM takes no actions?
- What if your LLM has no access to sensitive information?
- What if you don’t use Plugins?
- …

👍 Useful to start conversation about LLM app security

👎 Offers little help as how to ensure it

👎 Does not necessary apply to your system

- LLM01: Prompt Injection
- LLM02: Insecure Output Handling
- LLM03: Training Data Poisoning
- LLM04: Model Denial of Service
- LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
- LLM06: Sensitive Information Disclosure
- LLM07: Insecure Plugin Design
- LLM08: Excessive Agency
- LLM09: Overreliance
- LLM10: Model Theft

# NIST GenAI (NIST.AI.600-1)

👍 Explains what needs to be done and why
👍 Comprehensive
👎 Does not explain what actually needs to be done
👎 Unclear how to fit into your deployment

**MEASURE 1.3:** Internal experts who did not serve as front-line developers for the system and/or independent assessors are involved in regular assessments and updates. Domain experts, users, AI Actors external to the team that developed or deployed the AI system, and affected communities are consulted in support of assessments as necessary per organizational risk tolerance.

| Action ID | Suggested Action | GAI Risks |
|---|---|---|
| MS-1.3-001 | Define relevant groups of interest (e.g., demographic groups, subject matter experts, experience with GAI technology) within the context of use as part of plans for gathering structured public feedback. | Human-AI Configuration; Harmful Bias and Homogenization; CBRN Information or Capabilities |
| MS-1.3-002 | Engage in internal and external evaluations, GAI red-teaming, impact assessments, or other structured human feedback exercises in consultation with representative AI Actors with expertise and familiarity in the context of use, and/or who are representative of the populations associated with the context of use. | Human-AI Configuration; Harmful Bias and Homogenization; CBRN Information or Capabilities |
| MS-1.3-003 | Verify those conducting structured human feedback exercises are not directly involved in system development tasks for the same GAI model. | Human-AI Configuration; Data Privacy |
| **AI Actor Tasks: AI Deployment, AI Development, AI Impact Assessment, Affected Individuals and Communities, Domain Experts, End-Users, Operation and Monitoring, TEVV** | | |

# Kill Chain

- LLMs are parts of cyber systems…
- Interplay between chains?
- Techniques?







*Figure 1. NVIDIA AI Kill Chain: stages of an attack on AI-powered applications*

👍 Useful to understand different goals of attacker at different stages

👎 Does not show interplay with other systems

👎 Does not show interplay with other systems

# MITRE ATT&CK / ATLAS

## ATLAS Matrix

The ATLAS Matrix below shows the progression of tactics used in attacks as columns from left to right, with ML techniques belonging to each tactic below. & indicates an adaption from ATT&CK. Click on the blue links to learn more about each item, or search and view ATLAS tactics and techniques using the links at the top navigation bar. View the ATLAS matrix highlighted alongside ATT&CK Enterprise techniques on the ATLAS Navigator.

Filter by Maturity: Feasible — Demonstrated — Realized




- 👍 What attacker can do
- 👍 When/why attacker would do it
- 👎 Does not explain how to apply it to your system
- 👎 At times questionable (security by obscurity)

# STRIDE over DFD




- 👍 Specific to your application
- 👍 Explains where you can stop the attacker
- 👎 Exhausting and unsexy

↖ Which is exactly why we are going to do it.

# STRIDE over DFD Principle

- I was on the board that wrote this law, and that's not what the law was for!
- Sir, I can't speak to what you intended, but that's not what you wrote.


Lock Picking Lawyer
@ SaintCon

- There is a gap between what people think the thing they build does, and what it actually does
- Hacking is exploiting this gap.




Marcus Hutchins
~ "Hacker who saved the Internet"

# STRIDE over DFD for LLM Apps




- **Application organization**:
  - ~~How does the app work?~~
  - What an attacker can do?
- **Ingress point**:
  - Where the attacker can enter?
- **Attack target**:
  - What is the attacker seeking to achieve?

| Data Destruction? | Data Modification? |
|---|---|

- **Trust boundary**:
  - Where can we stop the attacker?

# STRIDE over DFD for LLM Apps




**S – Spoofing (data authenticity)**
Make RAG LLM read from your “Wikipedia”

**T – Tampering (data integrity)**
Make RAG LLM contradict real information

**R – Repudiation (data origin)**
Make RAG LLM cite a wrong source

**I – Information disclosure (privacy)**
Make RAG LLM divulgate the rest of the conversation

**D – Denial of Service (data availability)**
Make RAG LLM hang / DoS a resource

**E – Elevation of Privilege (access rights)**
Get a shell on a RAG LLM run environment

# STRIDE over DFD for LLM Apps




- Initially formulated in late 2023
  - Inspired by Black Hat AI Village
  - & LLM in Cybersecurity book (Terry Vogelsang (Kudelski) & Subho Majumdar (Vijil, garak))
- Predicted several techniques:
  - HF supply chain attack
  - GPT coding space escapes
  - Indirect prompt injections
- Contributed to several internal threat modeling frameworks

# My First Threat Model

<My First Threat Model>

(scenarios on Discord)

- Functionality
  - What is the business value of the application?
- Target
  - What can be of value to the potential attackers?
- Ingress points
  - Where a hacker can gain a first access?
- Trust boundaries
  - Where can a defender detect and block an attacker?
  - How they would do it?

# Threat Modeling Exercise




## Data / Decision / Compute

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Make RAG LLM read from your “Wikipedia”

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# GLC Top-5

# GLC-1: Input Sanitation







https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2024/m365-copilot-prompt-injection-tool-invocation-and-data-exfil-using-ascii-smuggling/

# MTG: Input Sanitation

**Do not use a prompted or fine-tuned generative LLM => SQL demo**




- Common Open Source approach:
  - LLaMA-Guard (**X** generative
  - Prompt-Guard
- Open Source:
  - Rebuff.ai (https://github.com/protectai/rebuff)
  - NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails (https://github.com/NVIDIA/NeMo-Guardrails)
  - LLM-Guard (https://github.com/protectai/llm-guard)\
- API access:
  - Lakera Guard (https://www.lakera.ai/lakera-guard)
  - Vijil Dome (https://www.vijil.ai/dome#harmful-input-and-output)

# GLC-1: Input Sanitation (Hard)






# GLC-2:
# Data Access Control




**BUSINESS INSIDER**

- **Microsoft released tools to address security issues with its AI assistant Copilot.**
- **Copilot's indexing of internal data led to oversharing of sensitive company information.**
- **Some corporate customers delayed Copilot deployment because of security and oversharing concerns.**

https://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-copilot-oversharing-problem-fix-customers-2024-11

More on logs later

# MTG:
# Data Access Control

**Do not rely on LLM alone for data access control => SQL demo**




## Control methods of Database Security

Last Updated : 15 Dec, 2021

**Database Security** means keeping sensitive information safe and prevent the loss of data. Security of data base is controlled by Database Administrator (DBA).

The following are the main control measures are used to provide security of data in databases:

1. Authentication
2. Access control
3. Inference control
4. Flow control
5. Database Security applying Statistical Method
6. Encryption

These are explained as following below.

# GLC-3: Dependencies









# GLC-3: Dependencies






# MTG: Dependencies

**Do not freeze dependencies, even for demos**

**Nothing is more eternal than demos in prod**




- Kreb's rule of online security 1:
  - If you didn't go looking for it, don't install it!
  - => Validate dependencies
- Kreb's rule of online security 2:
  - If you installed it, update it.
  - => Weekly update rebuilds
- Kreb's rule of online security 3:
  - If you no longer need it, remove it. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/05/krebss-3-basic-rules-for-online-safety/

# GLC-4: External Refs









# MTG: External Refs




- Treat external references as user inputs
  - Assume all external data as containing prompt injections
  - Sanitize all external data as if they were user input
  - => llama/Prompt-Guard
  - => Better: referenced data control

# GLC-5: Code Gen




r_ocky.eth
@r_cky0

| | Python | Node.JS | Ruby |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total questions | 21340 | 13065 | 4544 |
| Questions with at least one hallucination package by GPT-4 | 5347 (25%) | 2524 (19.3%) | 1072 (23.5%) |

"Huggingface-cli" downloaded >32 000 times

3:53 AM · 22 nov. 2024 · **355,1 k** vues

# MTG: Code Gen




- Treat code generated by LLMs as untrusted
  - Run LLM-generated code in sandboxed environment
    - Docker
    - chroot jail
  - Block the use of libraries outside allowlist
  - Block internet connections

# MTG: CodeGen: Type/Safe Pilot

(Baseline): Implement <risky task> in Scala.

(Baseline) Scala Code

(Critique) Find vulnerabilities in code below [Baseline]

(Critique) Found vulnerabilities + patch techniques

(TypePilot) Rewrite [Baseline] code to address [critique] using [Scala Type System Features ]

(TypePilot) Well-Typed Scala Code

# MTG: CodeGen: TypePilot

| | Qwen-2.5-Coder (32B) | | | CodeLlama (70B) | | | Deepseek-coder (33B) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Baseline | Robust | TypePilot | Baseline | Robust | TypePilot | Baseline | Robust | TypePilot |
| **Average age** | | | | | | | | | |
| - Correct for regular input | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| - Handle empty lists | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| - Handle negative ages | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| **Fibonacci number N** | | | | | | | | | |
| - Correct for regular input | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| - Check for negative N | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| - Handles large values of N | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| **Matrix multiplication** | | | | | | | | | |
| - Correct for regular input | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| - Check for empty matrices | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| - Check for dimension matching | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| **Matrix convolution** | | | | | | | | | |
| - Correct for square matrix input | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| - Correct for regular matrix input | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| - Handles rectangular kernels | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| - Checks for empty kernel | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| - Checks for empty matrix | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| - Handles even sized kernels | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |

# MTG: CodeGen: TypePilot

| | Qwen-2.5-Coder (32B) | | | CodeLlama (70B) | | | Deepseek-coder (33B) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Baseline | Robust | TypePilot | Baseline | Robust | TypePilot | Baseline | Robust | TypePilot |
| **HTML greeting** | | | | | | | | | |
| Correctness and compilation | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Robust to injection | ✗ | ~ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| **HTML comments** | | | | | | | | | |
| Correctness and compilation | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ~ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Robust to injection | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ~ | ✓ |
| **Bash file search** | | | | | | | | | |
| Correctness and compilation | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Robust to injection | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| **Bash host ping** | | | | | | | | | |
| Correctness and compilation | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Robust to injection | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| **URL redirect** | | | | | | | | | |
| Correctness and compilation | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Robust to injection | ✗ | ~ | ~ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |

If TypePilot **compiles,** it is correct and secure

(even before we talk to the compiler)

# GLC-Bonus: Private Data

**Treat the model trained or fine-tuned on private data as private data**




- Anonymization in ML is still not solved
  - Data reconstruction
    - Eg: Financial report for 2024
  - Data inference
    - Eg: Company X invested Y CHF in Company Z
  - Membership inference
    - Eg: Data from Company X was used to train the model

# Threat Modeling Will Take You Only So Far


*No plan survives*
*contact with the enemy*
*- von Moltke, 1871*

Real attacker are not limited by what defenders have anticipated.

Hence

We need the ability to detect them and analyze their actions.

**Logging is essential**

# Logging: What to Do

1. Logs must be sufficiently detailed
2. Logs must not be removable
   - Deletion impossible even by admins
3. Logging must not be “off-turnable”
4. Logs must be retained for sufficiently long
   - Investigation must be able to use them
5. Logs must be treated as private information
6. Logs must be monitored
7. **Action must be taken in case of anomalies**

# Logging: How To Do

- If local software logging system
  - Attach to it
- Otherwise
  - Local Logs
  - Push to External Services
    - WandB
    - Sentry
    - Discord
    - Slack
    - Mail
    - …

# HES-SO Gen Learning Center:

https://tinyurl.com/hevs-gen-learning

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


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